Review, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies in America’s Heartland, by Stephen E. Towne by Rothera, Evan
Secrecy and Society ISSN: 2377-6188 
Volume 2 
Number 1 Secrecy and Intelligence Article 10 
September 2018 
Review, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing 
Confederate Conspiracies in America’s Heartland, by Stephen E. 
Towne 
Evan Rothera 
Sam Houston University, ecr036@shsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety 
 Part of the American Studies Commons, and the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rothera, Evan. 2018. "Review, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing 
Confederate Conspiracies in America’s Heartland, by Stephen E. Towne." Secrecy and 
Society 2(1). https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/10 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information 
at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Secrecy and Society by an 
authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@sjsu.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. 
Review, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing 
Confederate Conspiracies in America’s Heartland, by Stephen 
E. Towne 
Abstract 
Review of Stephen E. Towne's Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing 
Confederate Conspiracies in America’s Heartland. 
Keywords 
Civil War, espionage, intelligence, spying, U.S. history 
This book review is available in Secrecy and Society: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/
secrecyandsociety/vol2/iss1/10 
Review, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate 
Conspiracies in America’s Heartland, by Stephen E. Towne
Reviewed by Evan C. Rothera
Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies 
in America’s Heartland. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015 / 442 pp. / 
ISBN 978-0-8214-2131-4 (hardback), 978-0-8214-2103-1 (paper), 978-
0-8214-4493-1 (ebook) / 
http://www.ohioswallow.com/book/Surveillance+and+Spies+in+the+Civil
+War
Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations about U.S. surveillance programs 
caused an uproar, both domestically and internationally. However, this was 
hardly the first instance of surveillance programs in U.S. history. During the 
U.S. Civil War, for example, “the U.S. Army kept a widespread surveillance 
over many persons in the loyal North” because they suspected that “large 
numbers of civilians in Northern states acted to impede the government’s 
steps to suppress the Southern rebellion” (Towne 2015, 2). Stephen E. 
Towne offers a compelling account of army intelligence work in Ohio, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Kentucky, and Missouri during the period 1861-1865. 
Although historians have offered some commentary about the importance of 
intelligence, they usually focus on intelligence in the field and areas of the 
U.S. South under occupation.1 In other words, historians have largely 
1 See, for instance, Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of 
Military Intelligence in the Civil War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996) and William 
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ignored military intelligence operations in the Old Northwest. Furthermore, 
most tend to dismiss fears of fifth column activity as phantoms of 
overheated Republican imaginations. As an associate university archivist at 
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Towne is well-placed to 
write this book because of his familiarity with regional archives and his 
access to long-ignored and recently discovered manuscript collections.
The Army “did not hesitate to employ its full gamut of resources to 
watch citizens, even frequently intercepting and opening private postal 
communications to read their contents and learn the plans of suspected 
persons” (Towne 2015, 4). However, the development of military intelligence
did not occur from the desire of a leviathan state to monitor people and 
control dissent. In fact, as with so many elements of the U.S. Civil War, this 
is more a story of the haphazard birth of intelligence and surveillance 
operations. Indeed, “army intelligence operations in the Old Northwest arose
in an unsystematic, decentralized, and ad hoc manner, without direction 
from Washington” (Towne 2015, 4). Towne focuses on two specific 
questions: did secret Democratic conspiratorial organizations exist and pose 
a threat to order in the North? In addition, did Republican politicians and 
politically minded officers conspire to fabricate the existence of such 
conspiracies? Because he answers “yes” to question one and “no” to 
question two, he challenges the longstanding analysis of Frank Klement that 
B. Feis, Grant’s Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2002).
2
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fifth column activity was more or less a fever dream of overzealous 
Republican partisans.2
In the early years of the war, reports of treason quickly filtered into 
the hands of officials, who took them very seriously. Unionists sent letters 
about possible secret organizations in their neighborhoods and became the 
eyes and ears of their governors. Governors Richard Yates of Illinois, Oliver 
P. Morton of Indiana, and William Dennison of Ohio received numerous 
reports about antiwar sentiment and disloyalty. However, despite their 
ardent desire to halt incipient fifth column activity, governors and federal 
officers lacked the means to investigate. President Abraham Lincoln, 
Attorney General Edward Bates, and Secretary of the Interior Caleb Blood 
Smith failed to offer support. Indeed, Towne does not give readers a 
triumphal image of the Lincoln administration. He argues that Lincoln’s 
relative neglect of efforts to combat collaboration by northerners with the 
rebels had a significant negative impact on politics during the U.S. Civil War.
Even more troublingly, “having told their law enforcement officers there was 
no money to support their investigations, Washington authorities perversely 
pushed officers to increase investigatory efforts” (Towne 2015, 28). 
Furthermore, law enforcement officers often had difficulty prosecuting 
2 See Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960); Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham 
and the Civil War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970); and Frank L. Klement, 
Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984). Towne offers a spirited refutation of 
the Klement thesis as does Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s 
Opponents in the North (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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cases. Although state and federal officials received reports of criminal 
conspiracies, their efforts to stop them were ineffectual, largely because 
they had no access to federal funds and could not hire investigators. Thus, 
facing a seemingly uncaring federal government, officials turned to the army
for help. Army commanders developed “a widespread espionage apparatus” 
to “fill the void left by a civilian law enforcement bureaucracy rendered 
incapable of pursuing major criminal conspiracy” (Towne 2015, 37). Again, 
military intelligence activities developed in spite of, rather than because of, 
the federal government. This should complicate discussions of intelligence 
and surveillance operations throughout U.S. history.
Towne has little use for U.S. Grant and William T. Sherman, in part 
because they seemed overly dismissive of dissent on the homefront. The 
heroes of this story are men like Henry B. Carrington, William S. Rosecrans, 
Samuel P. Heintzelman, Richard Yates, Oliver P. Morton, and others, often 
derided as ineffective commanders, poor administrators, and blind partisans.
They had the clarity to discern internal threats and enemies, where others 
did not. Carrington, in particular, became the most important intelligence 
officer investigating conspiracy in the Northwest. In December 1862, he 
received reports “that soldiers in units stationed around Indianapolis had 
become involved in secret organizations in their home communities” (Towne 
2015, 49). Carrington worked hand in hand with Governor Morton to fight 
secret societies. Furthermore, many soldiers helped fight homegrown 
4
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conspiracies, because they deeply resented the treasonous activity of 
Copperheads, or antiwar Democrats. Interestingly, although he performed 
very effectively, Carrington and his officers conducted minimal detective and
espionage work. However, people harkened to Carrington’s example and 
1863 proved a critical year in the development of intelligence networks. 
Cincinnati emerged as the intelligence center of the Department of the 
Ohio, a military district comprising the states of Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, 
Indiana, Wisconsin, and parts of Kentucky." In March 1863, General Horatio 
G. Wright authorized the creation of a detective force. General Ambrose 
Burnside soon replaced Wright. Political matters quickly took center stage 
because “increasing evidence of dissent, opposition to the war effort, and 
open, armed hostility to the government would hinder his [Burnside’s] ability
to push into Tennessee” (Towne 2015, 73). In addition to highlighting the ad
hoc development of surveillance networks and the relatively passive role of 
the central government, Towne explains how quarrels among people 
supposedly fighting for the same goals hampered intelligence work. Burnside
apparently lost confidence in Carrington because General Henry W. Halleck 
disliked Carrington who had not attended West Point. Even Governor 
Morton’s strong support could not keep Carrington in Indiana. Carrington’s 
exile aside, intelligence work continued. As “Cincinnati headquarters actively 
employing civilians and soldiers as detectives, other commands in the 
Department of the Ohio began to develop their own detective operations” 
5
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(Towne 2015, 81). Burnside usually preferred soldiers as detectives, but 
civilians soon began to serve in this important role. In sum, the Department 
of the Ohio’s intelligence operations were “large, multifaceted, and involved 
numerous commands” (Towne 2015, 86). 
The Enrollment Act of 1863, which provided for a national system of 
conscription, also “created an intelligence-gathering apparatus throughout 
the North” (Towne 2015, 89). The work of provost marshals as well as 
special officers and agents was difficult and dangerous, especially when they
arrested deserters in strongly antiwar communities. Reports of violent 
resistance became legion. In 1863, the army conducted surveillance of the 
arch-Copperhead Clement L. Vallandigham. Vallandigham had been exiled to
the South as a result of running afoul of Burnside’s General Orders No. 38. 
After a trip through the Confederacy, he took up residence in Canada. Many 
people assumed he planned to cross the border, return to Ohio, and spark a 
Copperhead rebellion against the federal government. Vallandigham became
a candidate for Governor of Ohio in 1863 and ran a virulently antiwar 
campaign from Canada. Intelligence operations not only provided 
information about desertion and draft resistance, they also yielded, quite 
troublingly, reports of plans to attack prisoner-of-war camps to liberate rebel
prisoners. Although the prison camps did not fall to saboteurs, they 
remained a persistent source of worry for officials. 
6
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1863 saw tremendous developments in the construction of surveillance
and intelligence networks. In 1864, these networks worked at their fullest 
potential. Samuel P. Heintzelman received command of the new Northern 
Department (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois). Contrary to his poor 
historical reputation, Heintzelman appears here as a capable administrator 
who grasped “the extent and intent of the secret groups” and “recognized 
the regional instability that imperiled his ability to protect the prison camps 
and keep down insurrection” (Towne 2015, 149). Morton and Carrington’s 
intelligence operations impressed Heintzelman. He began to rely heavily on 
Carrington and placed intelligence matters in his hands. Similarly, another 
maligned figure, William S. Rosecrans, the commander of the Department of
Missouri, proved equally perceptive in dealing with fifth column activity. 
Rosecrans and Colonel John P. Sanderson “rapidly built a wide-ranging 
detective force that provided important information on secret undercurrents 
both in his department and in the Northwestern states that neighbored it” 
(Towne 2015, 174). After Grant stripped the Department of Missouri of 
troops, Rosecrans had fewer options, but he shared intelligence with officials
in the Northern Department. Rosecrans, Carrington, Heintzelman, and 
Morton successfully utilized spies to infiltrate secret organizations and ferret 
out rumors about attacks on prison camps. Sargent Parker Coffin obtained 
important documents from the Order of American Knights. Felix Grundy 
Stidger successfully infiltrated the organization, at considerable personal 
7
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risk. In sum, as spies infiltrated the secret societies, Union leaders achieved 
an important advantage over their foes.
A theme throughout the book is that Lincoln’s seeming indifference to 
the situation in the Northwest exasperated military and civilian leaders. 
Rosecrans quarreled with various political factions in Missouri and Lincoln did
not allow him to travel to Washington to present a report on subversive 
activities. Lincoln instead sent John Hay to Missouri to receive the report. 
Rosecrans was far from the only person warning Lincoln about impending 
revolution in the Northwest. Governor Yates, one of Lincoln’s old friends, 
was equally concerned. Lincoln responded, rather myopically, that he trusted
“the people” (Towne 2015, 225). Although military and political leaders “had
developed intelligence networks that supplied them with vital information, 
they lacked direction and support from national leadership” (Towne 2015, 
235). Strikingly, commanders created a watch list, perhaps “the first 
instance in U.S. history of a comprehensive, centralized, internal-security 
watch list of persons deemed to be threats to the state” (Towne 2015, 243). 
Towards the end of July, federal officials changed their minds about the 
possibility of insurrection. This quite possibly owed something to the fact 
that Lincoln’s reelection bid looked like it would fail. Judge Advocate General 
Joseph Holt’s report confirmed much of what Rosecrans, Carrington, 
Heintzelman, Morton, Yates, and others had been telling Lincoln.
8
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Officials in Washington began to wake up to the threat of fifth column 
activity in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the coordination among civil and 
military officials “produced consensus that action had to be taken to head off
feared uprisings known to be in the offing” (Towne 2015, 246). Military 
officials thwarted uprisings, sometimes due to nothing more than the 
serendipitous arrival of additional troops, and continued to practice vigilance.
Military authorities successfully foiled plots because of their intelligence and 
surveillance work. However, as the election of 1864 drew ever nearer, 
rumors abounded of planned uprisings and attacks on prison camps. Shortly 
before the election, the information gained through the surveillance and 
intelligence work of soldiers and civilians resulted in the arrest of leaders and
the thwarting of a planned attack on Camp Douglas. This, Towne (2015, 
301) argues, “was a signal victory for army intelligence efforts in the Old 
Northwest.” It was also intensely embarrassing for many Democrats in the 
Old Northwest. As 1864 turned into 1865, officials began to conclude their 
work. With the rebel surrender, intelligence bureaus dissolved. It was not 
long before “postwar Americans swept the memory of espionage and 
deception under the carpet” (Towne 2015, 303). Towne (2015, 306) 
concludes, “the army’s network of spies, detectives, and informers was 
substantial” and that “this hidden army played a significant part in defending
the United States from widespread conspiracy in the North during the 
American Civil War.” 
9
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Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War is a fascinating book. Towne 
could probably say a bit more about the importance of race and racial ideas 
and might conduct more comparative work with other regions. However, 
anyone interested in the topic should read this book and think about 
important differences between what occurred during the U.S. Civil War and 
surveillance programs today. Copperheads were spectacularly unpleasant 
people. Virulent racism drove many, although not all, of their complaints 
against Lincoln and Republicans. They clustered into secret societies and 
frequently employed lethal violence when resisting the draft. They planned 
to liberate rebel prisoners and begin a revolution on the home front. Most 
people would agree that these actions justified the surveillance and 
intelligence work of Carrington, Morton, Heintzelman, and Rosecrans. 
Interestingly, despite the grave threat they posed to the integrity of the 
Union, the federal government played a relatively minor role in surveillance 
and intelligence operations in the Old Northwest. Today, conversely, the 
federal government is far less squeamish, and perhaps decidedly overeager, 
to surveil people, many of whom present no threat to the United States. 
Surveillance during the U.S. Civil War helped curtail fifth column activity and
might appear to be a positive element of the Union war effort. However, it is
much harder to consider today’s secret programs as having any positive 
impact. They seemingly do little more than erode people’s already tenuous 
trust in the government and make U.S. allies uncomfortable and angry. In 
10
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sum, by offering a detailed history of surveillance during one of the most 
consequential U.S. wars, this book prompts readers to think in a more 
nuanced manner about surveillance practices throughout the history of this 
country.
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